THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

ROUND TABLE

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A Radio Discussion of

THE NEW CONGRESS

A SERIES on

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN CRISIS

M. C. KRUEGER · H. D. LASSWELL · A. W. MACMAHON

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ROUND TABLE

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NOTE

The supplementary information contained in the footnotes to the following text, developed by staff research, is not to be considered as representing the opinions of the ROUND TABLE *speakers. Following the transcript of the broadcast are questions which readers may wish to use for analysis and discussion. It is hoped that teachers and discussion leaders may find this additional service of the* ROUND TABLE *transcript helpful in their study of the subject discussed in the broadcast.*

THE NEW CONGRESS

A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE BROADCAST*

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(*see p. 22 for further information*)

* A radio discussion broadcast from New York, over stations of the National Broadcasting Company, Sunday, November 8, 1942, at 2:30 P.M., Eastern War Time.

The ROUND TABLE, oldest educational program continuously on the air, is broadcast entirely without a script, although participants meet in advance, prepare a topical outline, and exchange data and views. Subjects are chosen because of their social, political, or economic significance. The program has no "ax to grind." In the selection of speakers, the effort is to provide a balanced discussion by participants who have special competence and knowledge. The opinion of each speaker is his own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of Chicago or the National Broadcasting Company.

THE NEW CONGRESS

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Last Tuesday, November 3, the nation went to the polls to vote in the first election since the United States entered the war. The voters were faced with the challenge of selecting a Congress to prosecute their war effort and, perhaps, even to make the peace. What did they decide? What do the election results mean?

Isolationism, manpower, and other national issues were raised by the candidates. What effect did these have upon the decisions of the voters? How did this wartime election compare with other mid-term congressional elections? Did the war apparently make any difference?

Will the new Congress be able to solve the problems that it must meet? Will it be necessary to change its setup to make it effective? What role should the Congress assume?

To discuss these and other important issues facing the new Congress, the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE *opened its microphones to three expert observers.*

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MR. KRUEGER: We've been told that a decisive battle of the war was fought last Tuesday at the polls. In this decisive battle what was decided?

MR. LASSWELL: This was the election that was not supposed to be, and it showed that our democratic institutions can work as smoothly in wartime as in peace.

MR. MACMAHON: I'd say that the most decisive thing about it

was that there was more unanimity in it than in any wartime election in our history. Don't you think so?

MR. LASSWELL: Indeed, yes, but I think that the problem, before we go much further with this, is to give a thumbnail sketch of the facts.

MR. KRUEGER: That's fairly easy. The Democrats lost. The Democrats lost thirty-eight seats in the House, and they apparently lost eight in the Senate. The Republicans gained a little bit more than that because they also wiped out some of the "mavericks" in the House.[1]

MR. MACMAHON: It's interesting that, of those eligible to vote, only 43 per cent did vote. I think that that is the lowest vote since 1930.

MR. LASSWELL: I think it's worth calling attention to the fact that, over the last forty years, the average loss of House seats in a mid-term election has been forty-two.

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[1] The present congressional line-up and the unofficial new one follow:

SENATE	Present	New	HOUSE	Present	New
Democrats	65	57	Democrats	258	223
Republicans	29	38	Republicans	165	208
Progressives	1	1	Progressives	3	2
Independents	1	0	Farmer-Labor	1	1
			American Labor	1	1
			Vacant	7	0

The Democratic peak was reached in 1937, when they had 75 Senate seats to only 17 for the Republicans. The Republicans will have a much stronger voice in the Senate than they have had since 1933. On any issue on which they vote solidly, they will have to pick up only 11 votes from conservative Democrats to control the Senate. The Republican power in the House will be even greater. If they hold their ranks together, they will have to pick up only 8 or 10 votes to carry any issue, depending upon how the majority-party members divide. In 1937 the Democrats had 333 seats, with only 89 in Republican hands.

MR. KRUEGER: Which means, then, that this election was very usual in that regard. This leaves the Democrats, as I count it up now, with a couple of seats still in doubt, with a margin of about twelve seats in the House and of about eighteen in the Senate.

MR. MACMAHON: It is interesting, isn't it, that it's just about the margin that Woodrow Wilson had in his war Congress in 1917–18.

MR. LASSWELL: It looks as if the real meaning of this election was election-as-usual in the mid-term.

MR. KRUEGER: So much then for the tally sheet.

It's important to analyze elections like this because it's in this sort of election that there are revealed the stresses and the strains in democratic government.

Let's hear stated the first important question that we're up against.

ANNOUNCER: *Many* ROUND TABLE *listeners have written us that they are confused by the election interpretations of various newspapers and political pundits. These listeners ask, "What did the people really vote for? Did they vote for a more vigorous prosecution of the war? Did they vote against social reforms in wartimes, against alleged inefficiency in government, or did they vote for isolationism or world cooperation?"*

MR. KRUEGER: Did the country go isolationist last Tuesday?

MR. MACMAHON: I'd say that in the face of a national consensus, somewhat blurred in character, good old localism asserted itself, especially because of the fact that the vague resentments in the situation had a chance to exert themselves.

MR. LASSWELL: One can, of course, call attention to the election of Fish and Hoffman in the House and certainly of Brooks in Illinois. But I think that the general point is the sound one that, after all, in the face of national consensus, isolationism was not an issue.

MR. KRUEGER: I'm not at all sure that you're quite accurate on that. Certainly some Republicans, noninterventionist Republicans, and some interventionist Republicans were elected, but I wouldn't interpret that to mean that everybody advocates all the measures that are involved in all-out prosecution of the war. Wasn't there a considerable amount of complaint about news censorship, for example?

MR. MACMAHON: There seems to have been a good deal of that in the closing weeks of the campaign.

MR. LASSWELL: It seems to me that one of the important things that has happened in this election is that the conservative press is undertaking to interpret it as an all-out defeat for New Dealism. Do you agree with that?

MR. MACMAHON: I do not. Do you?

MR. KRUEGER: Yes, I am inclined to think that there is something to that. There were a lot of people who were voting against the New Deal because there was too much social reform in wartime. But I know some people who were voting against the Roosevelt administration, also, because there wasn't enough social reform.

MR. LASSWELL: Hold on! It seems to me we ought to look at the evidence for the statement that was just made—that New Dealism lost the election. Is there much evidence on the point after all?

MR. KRUEGER: No, there's nothing that one can cite. This is a purely speculative matter. There are people who say very definitely that that is what happened, but I don't think one is able to weigh these matters at all and draw any definite conclusions about just what people tried to say.

MR. LASSWELL: I think we're on much sounder ground in talking about the effect of the protest against the Administration's inefficiency.

MR. MACMAHON: I should say that there was a great deal to that.

MR. LASSWELL: Of course, a good many people also interpret this election by saying that it does represent a general reaction against the closing-in of wartime restrictions.

MR. KRUEGER: There were a great many of those general complaints, I think. Some people objected to presidential interference, and some people were afraid that Roosevelt was going to be a dictator. A lot of people were undoubtedly voting against higher taxes. Some people were voting against the local Democratic machines, some farmers may have been voting against the coddling of labor, and some labor may have been voting against the New Deal because they weren't coddled enough.

MR. MACMAHON: I would say, on the labor front, that a good deal of the lack of interest in some labor quarters in getting out and hustling to the polls was due to a kind of disillusionment—some of it going back to 1940, but a good deal of it having to do with the belief that labor has more of a stake in this war than any other class and hasn't been able to participate as much as it had hoped to do.

MR. KRUEGER: There may have been some housewife objections to rationing's finally getting into the kitchen, and there may have been mothers objecting to their sons being drafted. There was probably a considerable amount of Negro objection to the discrepancy of what we do and what we say we do about race discrimination in this country. But what does all that add up to?

MR. LASSWELL: This is a terribly miscellaneous list of possibilities that you've just gone over. It strikes me that the most important thing to be said about this election, after all, is that it went just about the way one expects mid-term elections to go and that in all

probability it is a testimonial to the fact that there's been a great lack of clarity in making it perfectly plain to the public what our war aims are or the appropriateness of our different administrative measures to the successful prosecution of the war.

MR. MACMAHON: I would agree with you. I don't feel that we've created what I would call a "mass base" for a good deal of the wartime administration.

MR. LASSWELL: Excellent.

MR. KRUEGER: Do you mean that there isn't enough clarity about war aims, or do you mean that there isn't enough clarity about just why rationing, price control, and these various other measures are undertaken during the war?

MR. MACMAHON: I mean both—both the means and the end part of it—immediately the means and, soon to be faced, the ends.

MR. KRUEGER: It seems to me the conclusion would be, then, that the common denominator was protest. I'd add to that that most of these things that people were against, if they were against them, they are likely to get more of during the next couple of years instead of less.

MR. LASSWELL: Incidentally, on this point I think we ought to pay some attention to the various explanations that people are offering of how the people who stayed at home would have voted.

MR. MACMAHON: I would say on that that there were some young men in the Army and many workers and others moving around the country who lost the right to vote. Beyond that, I wonder whether we don't have people who are pretty well contented with the situation, not excited about it, staying away more than those who have a grievance.

MR. KRUEGER: Do you think it was content as much as it was

boredom? It seems to me that there were a great many people who stayed away because they didn't see anything important enough to go to the polls for. After all, boredom is a way of voting, too.

MR. LASSWELL: Do you mean that a lot of people think that the war is going on perfectly well and, therefore, they didn't want to exert themselves too much to go to the polls?

MR. KRUEGER: Or just didn't see any particular distinction that was offered to them among the candidates that they were asked to choose between.

MR. LASSWELL: Of course, there are plenty of people who don't want to vote against the party they are accustomed to vote for—the Democrats or the Republicans. These sometimes stay away from the polls just because they don't want to desert the old standby.

MR. MACMAHON: Speaking half-seriously, I've often thought that we ought to have on our ballots a place where a person could in effect say, "I'm willing to take the trouble to go a long distance to the polls, but I don't want to throw the party in power out, even though I don't quite like what it's doing; or I don't care for either of the alternatives suggested."

MR. KRUEGER: I think if we ran a ticket like that, with no candidates on it—representing pure protest—that it would probably turn out to be the majority party. A lot of people who did vote and a lot of people who didn't vote would fall into that category.

Let us get on to the next major question.

ANNOUNCER: *What are the general effects of the election on our military effort, on presidential power and prestige, and on the Democratic and Republican parties? In other words, many listeners are anxious to know whether the effect of the election will be the speeding-up or the slowing-down of military activity.*

MR. LASSWELL: I'd like to take a definite position on that particular point. I'd like to say that it seems to me clear that the net effect of this is going to be to speed up the military effort of the country.

MR. KRUEGER: You mean that the Administration will realize that the war has to be shortened, that there's some opposition to it or to its consequences, and that, unless the war is over by the next election, this Administration is sunk?

MR. LASSWELL: What I mean is that whatever the most speedy expedient is to bring this war to a successful conclusion it is the one that's likely to be adopted with renewed emphasis.

MR. MACMAHON: I would agree with that. The motive for speed is one thing—the President will certainly consider that from the political standpoint. The means of speed is another.

Do you imply that there should be more cooperation with our Allies and less emphasis upon the United States doing it alone?

MR. LASSWELL: No doubt you refer to the choice about which there's a great deal of discussion—the extent to which we should supply, promptly and immediately, our facilities to the United Nations and the extent to which we should build up our own strength so that we can make our ultimate contribution when we join our Allies later on down the war.

MR. KRUEGER: You would expect, then, that an administration, looking over the returns from this election, would, whenever it had its choice between a policy of strategy that would yield more certain results in the long run and another program that would yield perhaps less certain results but quicker, might shade the decision in favor of the quicker action?

MR. LASSWELL: Of speed.

MR. MACMAHON: If speed means more cooperation with our Allies, emphasis upon lend-lease, and the like, I would expect the election to have some effect. I'm not sure that the new congressmen will have any effect on that, though. What do you think?

MR. KRUEGER: You say that the election itself might result in more of a United Nations' war and less of an American lone hand. Are you making a judgment there or expressing a hope?

MR. MACMAHON: I'm expressing, I confess, a hope and an uninformed hope. But I wish to add that it seems to me that one of the mightiest decisions that we've ever made—perhaps we backed into it rather than going into it forward—was to put a good deal of emphasis upon fighting the war by ourselves.

MR. LASSWELL: Of course, what happens in our external activities depends greatly on what happens on our domestic front. I think one of the most interesting problems about that is the question of the relative prestige of Willkie and of Roosevelt.

MR. KRUEGER: What happened on that? Certainly the argument "stand by the President," which was used so much, overused by Democratic candidates throughout the country, wasn't enough to get a lot of them elected. If Roosevelt lost the election, and if the Republicans won the election, did Willkie lose the election with Roosevelt or did he win it with the G.O.P.?

MR. MACMAHON: I think that that question, whether he lost or won, will have to remain rhetorical, as perhaps you meant it. At any rate, it will have to wait for history.

Mr. Willkie has been mentioned. I would like to quote from his remarks in the recent campaign when he indorsed the Republican ticket and said that there shall be no negotiated peace and that, in view of modern developments—economic, political, and otherwise—the United States shall bear its full responsibility in world affairs, both now and after the war is over.

MR. KRUEGER: There is another question that interests me. We're talking about the new Congress. Is Roosevelt stronger or weaker in his control over the Democratic party?

MR. LASSWELL: That's a very important point because, I think, it's evident that the President has had a great deal of difficulty trying to control a Congress with an overwhelming majority. That, after all, is the usual history of what happens when there is a top-heavy majority.

MR. MACMAHON: If I may break in here, when the Democratic group was at its peak in 1937, Roosevelt did have a good deal of trouble keeping the group together.

MR. LASSWELL: That was the case exactly in point. Now, does that mean that at the present time, with a reduced majority, we can expect that the President's control of his own party is greater?

MR. MACMAHON: I think that to some extent individual members are dependent to a greater extent than before on national patronage. Do you think that that is true?

MR. LASSWELL: I think that it is.

MR. KRUEGER: It probably isn't true, is it, that the southern congressmen are more dependent on the President than they have been before? I would agree that the smaller majority in the House may give him more of a caucus whip hand over some of the Democrats in that small majority, but I'm inclined to doubt that that's very important. I do think it gives him a stronger control over the Democratic Convention in 1944, because federal patronage is going to control the 1944 Democratic delegations from most of the states in which the Democrats lost the state administration to the Republicans.

MR. LASSWELL: Of course, what happens depends, too, on the brilliance of the strategy of the opposition. Isn't that so?

MR. MACMAHON: I would say so. The Republicans now face a responsibility that they haven't faced before.

MR. LASSWELL: That's certainly true.

MR. MACMAHON: A vote may matter now in a way in which it didn't before.

MR. KRUEGER: Do you think that's going to lead the Republicans to do something that very few of them have ever done before—that is, be more statesmen and less politicians? After all, an election is looking at them in 1944, and the Republican nomination is going to be worth something for the first time in several years.

We're told that a politician is a man who looks forward to the next election; a statesman is a man who looks forward to the next generation. Will this election make statesmen out of Republicans?

MR. LASSWELL: Let me put one question about the tactics which the President can adopt at the moment. It's perfectly obvious to everybody that the Democratic party is split between conservatives and liberals. It's perfectly obvious the Republican party is split along the same lines. What's the possibility that the presidential tactics will be to unify the middle-of-the-roaders?

MR. MACMAHON: I think that the Democratic party has to try to reach out beyond the Solid South, and I think that the verdict of history is that it can't succeed nationally if it tries to be conservative.

MR. KRUEGER: Most of the verdict of history has been that, when the Democrats had the choice between maintaining white supremacy in the South and getting enough labor and farmer support from the North and the Southwest, they decided to stick with what was solid in the South.

MR. LASSWELL: Your point is, then, that in the South there is a

great deal of willingness to sacrifice the national future of the Democratic party for local interest?

MR. KRUEGER: I think that's quite likely, and I think that, as a matter of fact, Roosevelt wouldn't be very smart if he swapped the Solid South for all the liberals there are in the Republican party.

MR. MACMAHON: Isn't the "Solid South" many things really, and doesn't a lot depend upon what happens in the primaries down there in the next few years? It seems to me that the whole future of the party system is probably involved in the change of the Democratic party in the South.

MR. KRUEGER: I would hope so. It may be, of course, that both the Republican and the Democratic parties will start vying with each other as conservative parties and that there may be something of a split-off of a progressive or radical third party for 1944.

MR. LASSWELL: Wouldn't that be exactly the sort of thing that the Democratic party would most resent?

MR. KRUEGER: I should think both the Republican and the Democratic parties would resent it, but in the midst of a war they may not be able to prevent it.

There is another very important question that we ought to consider in connection with this topic. Let's have it stated.

ANNOUNCER: *In order to become more effective, do you think Congress should reorganize itself or streamline itself in any way? Several listeners charge that Congress has too many committees which make for inefficiency. How could streamlining Congress contribute to its handling better the many vital issues which face it?*

MR. KRUEGER: What about this question? Is Congress going to go in for overinterference with picayunish details, or is Congress going to buckle down and take itself seriously and do a balanced job of criticism?

MR. LASSWELL: The job of Congress, as you stated it, is either balanced criticism or overinterference. It seems to me perfectly reasonable to suppose that there are men in Congress who recognize that this very delicate and important line of distinction must be adhered to.

MR. MACMAHON: I would agree with that, and I think that it is seen by the more thoughtful members that Congress must avoid going so far into details that it divides responsibility with the Executive.

MR. LASSWELL: You have in mind, I take it, the famous and rather sad example of what happened during the Civil War, when the Congress exceeded its powers to such a point that people actually were forced to come before Congress and discuss the details of the military prosecution of the war.

MR. MACMAHON: I was thinking in part of that.

MR. KRUEGER: Why is it that Congress sometimes goes in for this picayunish interference with details? I think there are possibly two reasons. One is that Congress gets a lot of its prestige from bucking the President. Another reason is that this overinterference seems to be a kind of a "make-work" proposition. They interfere with detailed things because they don't know anything more important to do.

MR. MACMAHON: Getting over into your field, Lasswell, it seems to me that Congress suffers from a guilt complex that it has no right to have—a guilt complex because it thinks it ought to be handling a lot of details that aren't the job of a legislative body.

MR. LASSWELL: There are some legislators who are very well aware of the problem we've just been talking about. I refer to Rep-

resentative Dirksen, for instance, of Illinois. You've noticed the proposals that he's made for the internal streamlining of Congress. That seems to me terribly important.[2]

MR. KRUEGER: Dirksen's bills seem to provide for the Congress itself some of the same kind of agencies for getting adequate information and an over-all view, both on financial and on policy matters, that the Executive has at his disposal.

MR. LASSWELL: The one point is to have the advantage of the kind of experts who can give the kind of facts needed for rational judgment in Congress.

MR. MACMAHON: I would agree with that.

What is favorable in the Dirksen proposals above everything else is that here is a member of Congress who is breaking with the tradition of the body, which, on the whole, is complacency.

MR. KRUEGER: It is clear that the present committee system is not adequate to its twentieth-century job.

MR. LASSWELL: That's a very good point, and I think a great many important things could be improved in Congress without very extensive change.

Representative Dirksen has proposed a great deal of simplification in the committee structure of the Congress. As a matter of

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[2] Representative Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois has introduced several bills which are designed to improve the effectiveness of Congress. He proposes the creation of a joint committee of the Senate and House to deal with matters bearing on the conduct of the war, centralizing functions that are now scattered among more than a dozen committees. He proposes another committee on planning and reconstruction, and one on peace conditions, aided by experts. Finally, he proposes a General Accounting Office as an agency of Congress—a department of experts for the purpose of making a continuous check-up of the activities of the government.

fact, as it now stands, there are certainly around eighty congressional committees.[3]

By the way, on this business of interference with executive prosecution of the war, Mr. Nelson, during the time that he's been in office, has been summoned before ten different congressional committees, on twenty-two different occasions, to testify.

MR. KRUEGER: I'm not worried so much about the amount of Mr. Nelson's time that that takes. The important aspect, it seems to me, about that is this: a Congress that is organized that way cannot perform the policy-determining function that it needs to perform. I don't think, however, that merely streamlining the procedure of Congress is going to be enough to save Congress.

MR. LASSWELL: What do you mean "save Congress"?

MR. KRUEGER: I mean that Congress needs to be saved—that legislative bodies are taking it in the neck from executives all over the world and have been now for some time.

MR. LASSWELL: You are referring to the famous and very important change that is taking place in the position of democratic institutions in the world. After all, in the nineteenth century people expected and looked to the legislature as the agency that expressed

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[3] The work of preparing and considering legislation is done largely by committees of both houses of Congress. There are 33 standing committees in the Senate and 45 in the House of Representatives. In addition, there are special committees in each house, and approximately 31 congressional commissions and joint committees composed of members of both houses. Each house may also appoint special investigating committees.

The personnel of the standing committees of each house is chosen by a vote of the entire body; members of other committees are appointed by the presiding officers.

All bills and resolutions are referred to the appropriate committees, which may report a bill out in its original form, vote against it in committee, make changes, or allow the proposed legislation to die in committee.

and formulated policy and maintained a general control over the guidance of the executive. Now there's been some change in the relative amount of trust and hope that people attach to these legislative agencies.

The problem seems to me to streamline a Congress that can perform this policy-defining and goal-clarifying objective for the nation and for the executive.

MR. MACMAHON: I would say "policy determining." The legislative body must expect a great deal of the initiative to come from outside itself. In addition, it should inform and supervise.

MR. LASSWELL: That's a terribly important point, because the fact of the matter is that at the present time, in a complicated society like ours, most of the initiatives for social action are very well worked out by the experts who are attached, let's say, to the N.A.M. or the C.I.O. or to the various government departments and agencies, so that one of the main problems that the Congress has is to sift from among the rather well-developed proposals which come to it.

MR. KRUEGER: Initiative seems to come from the Executive. It comes from these agencies in between the Executive and the Congress and from trade associations and labor groups, as you say.

The one place where initiative doesn't come from (and this is, I think, the greatest weakness in American political life at the present time) is the political parties. Neither the Republican nor the Democratic party has a program that leads one to expect that a Congress can go ahead and map out any kind of a coherent program of legislation.

MR. MACMAHON: Without underscoring at all what we've said about streamlining Congress, I agree with you that the real solution is in national parties with national programs.

MR. LASSWELL: You have in mind, I suppose, the usual point that's made by students of government—that our Congress has a particularly difficult task in keeping national, as distinguished from local, considerations in front, in contrast with the situation, for example, in English democracy. The congressman in England has the possibility actually of having to go and fight for re-election the moment he disagrees fundamentally with the line of the executive. That means that he must take a responsible position on national matters.

MR. MACMAHON: I would agree with that, and the limit it seems to me, in the proposed reforms of Congress, comes when Congress so equips itself with experts and the rest that it begins to divide responsibility with the Executive to a point of confusion. If that comes, we might as well have parliamentary government.

MR. KRUEGER: The old Congress, when it reconvenes tomorrow, is going to have to make a decision on the conference report on whether eighteen-year-old draftees shall get a full year of training before they're shipped anywhere. The new Congress is going to have far more important questions than that to tackle. Aren't they going to have to do something about the whole manpower question?

MR. MACMAHON: I think it's quite evident that the manpower issue has been postponed for the present. Labor favors that; Republican leaders favor that. But I think the issue will have to be faced, in some form, next year.

MR. LASSWELL: One of the most important questions that's coming up immediately concerns the power which the President has requested over the customs. That will be particularly important because that will show the degree of confidence in the Executive which is given in the centralization of our external relations.[4]

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[4] The President's message of November 2, 1942, said in part:

". . . . To achieve an all-out war production effort, we must implement and

MR. KRUEGER: Speaking with all the prejudices of an economist, one of the most important questions that this Congress has got to do better on than the last one did is the tax question. Financing a ninety-billion-dollar federal program on the basis of a tax bill that brings in twenty-five or thirty billion dollars, as the 1942 Revenue Act will, is plain nonsense. It heads straight for inflation. Neither the Administration nor the old Congress has done a decent job of explaining that issue to the people.[5]

MR. MACMAHON: The lag in the passage of the 1942 tax act seems to me one of the faults of the present Congress. But I think part of the trouble was the President's failure to put on enough "heat" in regard to the projection of the progressive principle downward.

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supplement the steps already taken by the Congress and the President to eliminate those peacetime restrictions which limit our ability to make the fullest and quickest use of the world's resources.

"At my direction, the government agencies have already removed and are engaged in removing, wherever possible, numerous administrative requirements and formalities affecting the movement of war goods, information, and persons into or out of the United States. There remain, however, many legislative obstacles to that movement which impede and delay our war production effort.

"These obstacles fall into two classes: Those directly affecting the movement to and from the customs territory of the United States of material, information, and persons needed for the war effort, such as customs duties and the laws, and the administrative supervision required by law affecting movement of persons and property at our borders and ports. And those which impose limitations on the procurement, acquisition, or use of non-American articles or the transportation of supplies in non-American bottoms. . . . .

"It is my judgment that the problem can best be dealt with by giving to the President for the duration of the war, but no longer, the power on a selective and flexible basis to suspend the operation of all or any such laws, in such a way as to meet new and perhaps unforeseen problems as they may arise, and on such terms as will enable the chief executive and the government agencies to work out in detail parallel action in other countries."

[5] See *Your Taxes*, a University of Chicago ROUND TABLE transcript No. 238, broadcast October 12, 1942.

MR. LASSWELL: Here's an opportunity, then, for the Republican party, with its new-found strength, to take the lead in insisting upon the fundamental importance of adopting a tax policy that will be adequate to forestall inflationary tendencies in the nation.

MR. KRUEGER: Or for the Democrats to maintain their leadership by talking more sense on the tax question.

MR. LASSWELL: Agreed.

MR. KRUEGER: But what's this new Congress likely to face in the way of peace and post-war problems? This may be—or it may not be—the post-war Congress as well.

MR. MACMAHON: It may be. I have thought of the war in longer terms, but I do feel that we have got to take the post-war in our stride with the war, partly because I don't feel one can fight a fully vigorous war if he doesn't think about the future. If one takes polls of laboring people, he finds that they are worrying about a depression; of capitalists, about overplant capacity. That sort of anxiety can be allayed only by thinking about the future and acting about it.

MR. LASSWELL: Excellent. It seems to me that you've put the emphasis exactly where it belongs. It's terribly important for people to be clear about total policy, and that means total policy in war and in peace.

MR. KRUEGER: In contrast to all the plans that the Executive and his various agencies have been looking at on post-war matters, isn't it true that this Congress has had no agency or any committee studying any kind of post-war reconstruction?

MR. MACMAHON: They have failed, thus far, to pass the enabling resolution.

MR. KRUEGER: We've been talking about the new Congress. There was, in the recent election, the usual mid-term shift from the

party in power. More people didn't vote than usual. Otherwise, on issues politics was pretty much as usual.

The election didn't really decide any issues, but the election will have effects. It may have the effect of speeding up the war. It may have the effect of speeding up the war economy itself, even though there are some people who may have been objecting to some parts of the war economy. It may shake up either the Republican or the Democratic party. It may shake up the party system itself.

We agree that Congress needs to do a lot of streamlining of its committee system, and so on, but because this Congress has got to face more frankly the important issues of manpower, taxes, social legislation, and the peace, these questions are up to the Administration as well to the new Congress.

Around the Round Table . . . .

HAROLD D. LASSWELL is a political scientist and has been director of the War Communications Research Project of the Library of Congress since 1939. He attended the University of Chicago and received his Ph.B. in 1922, his Ph.D. in 1926. He was also a graduate student at the universities of London, Geneva, Paris, and Berlin in 1923, 1924, and 1925. He first joined the faculty of the political science department of the University of Chicago in 1922 and was Associate Professor of Political Science from 1932 to 1938. His visiting lectureships at other institutions of higher learning were many and as far-flung as Yenching University in Peking, China, in 1937. In 1938–39 he was Lecturer in Political Science at the Washington School of Psychiatry, Washington, D.C. He is widely known as the author of many provocative and significant books, among which are: *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (1927), *Psychopathology and Politics* (1930), *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (1935), *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How* (1936), *World Revolutionary Propaganda: A Chicago Study* (with Dorothy Blumenstock) (1939), and *Democracy through Public Opinion* (1941). He is advisory editor of *Ethics* and associate editor of *Public Opinion Quarterly*.

MAYNARD C. KRUEGER, now Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago, studied both history and international politics before specializing in economics. He completed his undergraduate education at the University of Missouri in 1926. After receiving his A.M. from that institution in 1927, he joined the staff of Albion College as an instructor in history. He spent three years in Europe studying at the universities of Paris, Berlin, and Geneva. From 1928 until he joined the faculty of the University of Chicago in 1932 he taught in the School of Finance and Commerce at the University of Pennsylvania. In addition to his scholarly activity, politics is a major interest. In 1940 he ran as vice-presidential candidate for the Socialist party and is now national chairman of the Socialist party.

ARTHUR W. MACMAHON is Professor of Public Administration in the department of government and public law of Columbia University. He received his A.B. from Columbia in 1912, his A.M. in 1913, and his Ph.D. in 1923. He was a member of the President's Committee on Administrative Management, which in 1937 submitted to the President and Congress the famous report on reorganization of the federal government. He authored the section on "Departmental Management." Among his books are: *Selection and Tenure of Bureau Chiefs in the National Administration of the United States* (1923), *Federal Administrators: A Biographical Approach to the Problems of Departmental Management* (with John D. Millett) (1939), and *The Administration of Federal Work Relief* (with Millett and Ogden) (1941).

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QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The following questions of wider scope, intended for discussion, are suggested by the broadcast, and answers may be found in the literature on the subject listed in the section "Suggested Readings," found on pages 23–24.

*

1. In your opinion what did the elections on November 3, 1942, decide? Did the elections show that the American people are dissatisfied with the conduct of the war? Did the people make any decision on the isolationist-interventionist issue? On taxes? On manpower mobilization? On farm prices? Discuss.

2. What political party or factions will control Congress? Was the farm bloc one of the winners in the elections? Does the President

need to have the Democrats control Congress if his policies about the conduct of the war are to be followed?

3. How should Congress organize itself to help win the war? Is the present complicated committee system adequate and necessary? Do you think Congress should provide itself with a technical staff, amalgamate committees, and set up a joint committee to investigate the conduct of the war? Does Congress have the stability and coherence of membership and responsibility to make possible a unified policy and long-range planning?

4. What should be the role of Congress in relation to the President? Should Congress accept presidential supremacy in matters of initiative on policy or try to check it? How would you state the responsibility and the constructive limits of congressional criticism and power?

5. Arthur C. Millspaugh's Brookings Institution survey on American institutions concludes in regard to Congress: "During the last half-century Congress of necessity has increasingly delegated legislative powers to administrative agencies. . . . . The tendency has been for members of Congress to be on the one hand delegates with localized interests and on the other rubber stamps in the hands of the President. . . . . In recent years the national legislature has shown, by and large, little capacity for popular leadership. The functions of debate and of crystallization of opinion are no longer centered in the national legislature." Comment and suggest how this situation might be improved.

6. Do you agree that the verdict of history is that the Democratic party "can't succeed nationally if it tries to be conservative"? What initiative should the political parties give in mapping out national policy? Do the Republican or Democratic parties have a policy that will result in a coherent program of legislation? To what extent is congressional voting on the basis of party politics?

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163. *Lessons from Europe's War*
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169. *War against the Middle Classes?*
173. *Our Liberties*
174. *Blueprint for Hemisphere Defense*
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178. *Japan: Setting Sun?*
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186. *Anti-Semitism*
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192. *The Philippines*
193. *Little Business: What Now?*
194. *Labor's Responsibility in Defense*
195. *Canada: Neighbor at War*
197. *Manpower: The Key to Victory*
198. *What Does Rationing Mean?*

1942

199. *Morale: Ours and Theirs*
200. *How To Meet the Menace of Inflation*
201. *Censorship*
202. *How United Are the Americas?*
203. *Are We Overconfident?*
204. *Labor Policies in Wartime*
206. *What Should We Teach Our Youth Now?*

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207. *Propaganda: Good and Bad*
208. *Civilian Defense*
209. *Taxes* vs. *Axis*
210. *Women, Work, and the War*
211. *The American Temper*
212. *India*
214. *War Profits*
215. *War and the Family*
216. *Politics in Wartime*
217. *Aliens in Our Midst*
218. *Radio in Wartime*
219. *Children and the War*
220. *Limiting Wartime Incomes*
221. *Education for Freedom*
222. *The United Nations*
223. *China*
224. *The Near East*
225. *Congress Investigates*
226. *Crisis in Shipping*
227. *Must We Hate Our Enemies?*
228. *War Comes to the Farm*
229. *Should We Discuss the Next Peace Now?*
230. *Political Reconstruction of the Post-war World*
231. *Economic Requisites of a Durable Peace*
232. *Challenge of the Four Freedoms*
233. *Health in Wartime*
234. *Wage Policy in Wartime*
235. *The Rubber Crisis*
236. *Farm Parity*
237. *Congress and the War*
238. *Your Taxes*
239. *The Rediscovery of America*
240. *The Press*
241. *Manpower.* November 1

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ROUND TABLE NETWORK OF 104 STATIONS

2:30 P.M. EASTERN WAR TIME

City	Call Letters	Kilocycles	City	Call Letters	Kilocycles
Allentown, Pa.	WSAN	1470	Lima, Ohio	WLOK	1240
Altoona, Pa.	WFBG	1340	Manchester, N.H.	WFEA	1370
Asheville, N.C.	WISE	1400	Miami, Fla.	WIOD	610
Atlanta, Ga.	WSB	750	New York, N.Y.	WEAF	660
Baltimore, Md.	WBAL	1090	Norfolk, Va.	WTAR	790
Bluefield, W.Va.	WHIS	1440	Philadelphia, Pa.	KYW	1060
Boston, Mass.	WNAC	1260	Pittsburgh, Pa.	KDKA	1020
Buffalo, N.Y.	WBEN	930	Portland, Me.	WCSH	970
Charleston, S.C.	WTMA	1250	Providence, R.I.	WJAR	920
Charlotte, N.C.	WSOC	1240	Raleigh, N.C.	WPTF	680
Cleveland, Ohio	WTAM	1100	Richmond, Va.	WMBG	1380
Columbia, S.C.	WIS	560	Rochester, N.Y.	WHAM	1180
Columbus, Ohio	WCOL	1230	Savannah, Ga.	WSAV	1340
Dayton, Ohio	WING	1410	Schenectady, N.Y.	WGY	810
Detroit, Mich.	WWJ	950	Springfield, Ohio	WIZE	1340
Florence, S.C.	WOLS	1230	Tampa, Fla.	WFLA	970
Grand Rapids, Mich.	WOOD	1300	Toledo, Ohio	WSPD	740
Greenville, S.C.	WFBC	1330	Washington, D.C.	WRC	980
Jacksonville, Fla.	WJAX	930	Wilmington, Dela.	WDEL	1150
Johnstown, Pa.	WJAC	1400	Winston-Salem, N.C.	WSJS	600
Lakeland, Fla.	WLAK	1340	Zanesville, Ohio	WHIZ	1240

1:30 P.M. CENTRAL WAR TIME

Amarillo, Texas	KGNC	1440	Louisville, Ky.	WAVE	970
Birmingham, Ala.	WBRC	960	Madison, Wis.	WIBA	1310
Bismarck, N.D.	KFYR	550	Mankato, Minn.	KYSM	1230
Bristol, Tenn.	WOPI	1490	Memphis, Tenn.	WMC	790
Chicago, Ill.	WMAQ	670	Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minn.	KSTP	1500
Dallas, Texas	WFAA	820	New Orleans, La.	WSMB	1350
Duluth, Minn., and Superior, Wis.	WEBC	1320	Oklahoma City, Okla.	WKY	930
Eau Claire, Wis.	WEAU	1070	Omaha, Neb.	WOW	590
El Paso, Texas	KTSM	1380	Pittsburg, Kans.	KOAM	810
Evansville, Ind.	WGBF	1280	Rochester, Minn.	KROC	1340
Fargo, N.D.	WDAY	970	St. Cloud, Minn.	KFAM	1450
Fort Wayne, Ind.	WGL	1450	St. Louis, Mo.	KSD	550
Fort Worth, Texas	KGKO	570	San Antonio, Texas	WOAI	1200
Hattiesburg, Miss.	WFOR	1400	Shreveport, La.	KTBS	1480
Indianapolis, Ind.	WIRE	1430	Sioux Falls, S.D.	KSOO	1140
Jackson, Miss.	WJDX	1300	Springfield, Mo.	KGBX	1260
Kansas City, Mo.	WDAF	610	Terre Haute, Ind.	WBOW	1230
Kingsport, Tenn.	WKPT	1400	Tulsa, Okla.	KVOO	1170
Laurel, Miss.	WAML	1340	Wichita, Kans.	KANS	1240
Little Rock, Ark.	KARK	920			

12:30 P.M. MOUNTAIN WAR TIME

Albuquerque, N.M.	KOB	1030	Phoenix, Ariz.	KTAR	620
Billings, Mont.	KGHL	790	Pocatello, Ida.	KSEI	930
Boise, Ida.	KIDO	1380	Salt Lake City, Utah	KDYL	1320
Bozeman, Mont.	KRBM	1450	Tucson, Ariz.	KVOA	1290
Butte, Mont.	KGIR	1370	Twin Falls, Ida.	KTFI	1270
Denver, Colo.	KOA	850	Yuma, Ariz.	KYUM	1240
Helena, Mont	KPFA	1240			

11:30 A.M. PACIFIC WAR TIME

Bakersfield, Cal.	KERN	1410	Sacramento, Cal.	KFBK	1530
Fresno, Cal.	KMJ	580	San Francisco, Cal.	KPO	680
Los Angeles, Cal.	KFI	640	San Diego, Cal.	KFSD	600
Medford, Ore.	KMED	1440	Seattle, Wash.	KOMO	950
Portland, Ore.	KGW	620			

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SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1942

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NEIL H. JACOBY, Professor of Finance, School of Business, University of Chicago

LEONARD D. WHITE, Professor of Public Administration, University of Chicago

(THIRD SPEAKER TO BE ANNOUNCED)

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SUGGESTED READINGS

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